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This paper focuses on the interaction between regulation and competition in an industrial
organisation model. We analyse how capital requirements aﬀect the proﬁtability of two
banks that compete as Cournot duopolists on a market for loans. Bank management
of both banks choose optimal levels of loans provided, equity ratio and eﬀort to reduce
loan losses so as to maximise proﬁts. From the regulator’s point of view, the free market
solution is not optimal as private banks do not take into account the consumer surplus
and the social cost of bankruptcy (ﬁnancial stability aspects). It is shown that capital
requirements may improve welfare, even under conditions that both banks would never
default. Moreover, we ﬁnd that higher capital requirements impose a higher burden on
the ineﬃcient bank than on the eﬃcient one, even though the requirement may only be
binding for the eﬃcient bank. If the ineﬃcient bank chooses a strategy that might result
in bankruptcy, capital requirements are particularly welfare improving.
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The ﬁnancial services industry is generally seen as unique in the sense that the importance
of a sound ﬁnancial system has probably led to more regulatory interference in this industry
than in any other. Traditionally, this interference has primarily been of the “command
and control” type, in which the regulator states what regulated banks can and cannot do.
This direct approach has been called into question as the distortionary eﬀects of this kind of
regulation may be severe. The main reason for the distortions is the informational asymmetry.
Regulators do not observe all the actions of the bank, and therefore can in general not impose
a ﬁrst best solution. As the regulations can not be tailor made, they might have unintended
consequences in that the regulations might aﬀect the behaviour of regulated banks thereby
creating moral hazard problems.
Recently, the emphasis in regulation has shifted towards the “incentive-compatible” ap-
proach. This approach seeks to align the incentives of the ﬁrm’s owners and operators with
social objectives. By means of sticks and carrots the bank management is encouraged to fulﬁl
the regulators objectives. The regulator spells out desired outcomes and then allows the ﬁrm
to determine how best to achieve these goals. The 1995 amendment of the Basle Accord,
known as the “internal models approach” can be seen as an example of this tendency. This
amendment allows banks to use their internal risk models to determine the capital require-
ment for market risk. Regulators backtest the reported risk levels to see if they are reliable.
If they are, future capital requirements may be reduced, whereas too low reported risk levels
will result in an increase.
Although theoretically superior, the practical problems related to the incentive compatible
approach are numerous. Especially if exceptionally large risks that occur with very low
probability are to be taken into account, ﬁnding the optimal penalty scheme is far from
trivial.1 These very large risks are potentially the most dangerous for the solvability of the
bank, but as there frequency is so low, the validity of the models predicting these risks can
only be tested over very long time periods. As data are often not available, backtesting
these models is hardly feasible. Consequently, at least part of the regulation will probably
remain of the command and control type, and within this category capital controls are the
most popular instrument. Moreover, also under the incentive compatible approach, capital
requirements form an important instrument.
Moral hazard issues have been at the centre of much of the recent research on regulation
1See Marshall and Prescott (2000) for a feasible scheme if the risk proﬁle of assets is known to the supervisor.
2of ﬁnancial institutions.2 Most of this literature focuses on situations where there is just
one bank. Not much research has been conducted so far in the interaction of banks in a
regulated environment. Especially for the discussion whether it is important to treat all
ﬁnancial institutions equally (to create a “level playing ﬁeld”) the interaction is crucial.
One paper that does address the interaction is Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (2000). They
ﬁnd that capital requirements aﬀect the proﬁtability of eﬃcient banks more than ineﬃcient
banks. The eﬃcient bank is hit hardest if there are competitors that are not regulated, less
in monopoly setting and the least when his competitors are also regulated.
In this paper we challenge the results found by Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (2000), using
a similar industrial organisation model in which two banks compete as Cournot duopolists
for risky loans. The main diﬀerences with Boot et al. are that we assume that the banks face
a private cost of bankruptcy, and that the deposit insurance fund will only pay if the bank
indeed fails. Under these conditions we ﬁnd that higher capital requirements impose a higher
burden on the ineﬃcient bank than on the eﬃcient one. If the capital requirement is only
binding for the eﬃcient bank, this bank might even improve its proﬁtability. Especially if the
ineﬃcient bank might choose a fail strategy in the absence of regulation, the introduction of
capital requirements improves the proﬁtability of the good bank.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst describes the model. Then
the eﬀects of capital requirements on a monopoly bank are given, followed by the results for a
duopoly under the assumption that both banks would never fail. The ﬁnal subsection outlines
the eﬀects of capital requirements in the case that the ineﬃcient bank would choose a fail
strategy in the absence of regulation. Section 3 summarises the main conclusions, Appendix
A gives the mathematical solutions of the optimal behaviour, and AppendixB provides proofs
of the propositions.
2 The model
Our basic model is a static industrial organisation model in which banks compete for risky
loans as Cournot duopolists. In period zero banks attract equity and deposits, provide loans,
and decide on their monitoring eﬀort. In period one the state of the world is revealed, loans
are repaid subject to credit losses, bank employees and depositors are subsequently paid,
whereas shareholders get what is left. Although dynamic aspects are not explicitly modeled,
2See for instance Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Freixas and Rochet (1997),Bhattacharya,Boot,and
Thakor (1998) for literature overviews.
3banks implicitly value continuation as they face a private cost of default.
2.1 Characterisation of the loan market
The main activity of banks in our model is the provision of risky loans. The riskiness of the
loans is due to possible credit losses. The per-unit loan losses of bank τ, denoted Lτ, depend
inversely on the per-unit eﬀort (mτ) bank τ has put in monitoring the loans, and on the state










In the absence of monitoring one third of the principal of the loan is lost in the worst state
of the world whereas in the good state one ﬁfteenth is lost. The per-unit costs of monitoring
the loans (Vτ) are assumed linear in the eﬀort put into it:
Vτ = ατmτ, (2)
where ατ is a bankspeciﬁc parameter. We assume there are potentially two banks in the
market, one good bank (indexed G) and one bad bank (indexed B). The good bank is more
eﬃcient than the bad bank (αG <α B).4
The loans are ﬁnanced by insured deposits, for which the interest rate r is assumed ﬁxed,
and equity. Funding by equity is relatively expensive for banks as equity holders require a
risk premium ρ.5 The shareholders get all residual proceeds, if positive, from the loans after
all other expenses have been paid.
Each bank competes as a Cournot duopolist and chooses a quantity of loans to produce,
given by Qτ, where τ ∈{ G,B}. The per-unit price of loans, denoted P, is determined by
the inverse demand function:
P(Ω,Q G,Q B)=Ω− QG − QB (3)
3The results are qualitatively similar if a uniform loss distribution is assumed instead. For this more
diﬃcult distribution it is no longer possible to ﬁnd an analytical solution for the situation in which the bad
bank might fail in a bad state of the world. Numerical solutions can still be found however.
4Throughout the paper,the names good bank and eﬃcient bank are used interchangeably,as are bad bank
and ineﬃcient bank.
5The assumption of a ﬁxed risk premium can be relaxed. Similar,but more complex,solutions result if the
risk premium is a linear function of the standard deviation of returns or the probability of default.
4where Ω is the intercept in the price function. This intercept can be interpreted as the
maximum price the marginal consumer would be willing to pay for the loan in the absence
of loan supply.
The bank management is assumed to maximise expected extraordinary proﬁts. By this
we mean proﬁts in excess of the minimum required expected proﬁt needed to be able to
attract equity. As the required rate of return on equity is higher than that on deposits,
without further assumptions the bank would never be inclined to attract equity. We provide
a positive role to equity as a buﬀer against bad states of the world by assuming that the
bank faces a private cost of bankruptcy (Dτ). The motivation for this cost is twofold. From
the point of view of the individual banker, bankruptcy ruins his reputation and thereby his
expected future income. In terms of shareholder value the bankruptcy cost represents the
loss of the franchise value (i.e. the capitalised value of expected future proﬁts) of the bank
in case of bankruptcy (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 2000).6 We will assume that the
bankruptcy cost for the good bank are suﬃciently high, such that it will never be proﬁtable
for this bank to pursue strategies that might lead to bankruptcy. A higher cost of default for
the most eﬃcient bank is reasonable given the higher franchise value for this bank.
The regulator is entitled to impose minimum capital requirements (δmin) that limit the







Qτ(P−Lτ−Vτ−(1+r)−δτρ)i f P ≥Lτ+Vτ+(1−δτ)(1+r)
−Qτδτ(1 + r + ρ) − Dτ otherwise
(4)
such that δτ ≥ δmin.
where E(Πτ) denotes the expected proﬁt of bank τ and δτ represents the bank speciﬁc equity
ratio.
2.2 Solution for a monopoly
The ﬁrst case considered is the one where the bad bank is not eﬃcient enough to make a
proﬁt.7 This benchmark case is illustrative for the eﬀects of capital requirements on bank
behaviour and proﬁt, as the additional eﬀects of the interaction between banks is not relevant
then. All mathematical derivations are given in AppendixA. In the main tex t most results
will be shown graphically. The calibrated numbers that were used to generate the ﬁgures
6The implicit assumption behind this argument is that the link between shareholders and the bank remains
extant after period one. This is the case if not all equity is returned to the shareholders in period one.
7In the model,this is the case if both αB and DB are suﬃciently high.
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are shown in Table 1. The risk free deposit rate is assumed to be 4% annually and the risk
premium is 8% annually. Reducing credit losses by one half will cost the bank 2%. Demand
is such that the maximum interest rate to be paid on loans is 20%.
Table 1: Parameters used for monopoly
rρ Ω αG DG
4/100 8/100 6/5 1/50 1
Figure 1 shows the results based on optimal bank behaviour for various capital require-
ments. The bank faces two constraints that must be met. On the one hand the minimum
capital requirement and on the other the no default constraint. The ﬁgure shows three dif-
ferent phases, related to the importance of these constraints. During the ﬁrst phase (here as
long as δmin < 5.0%), only the nofail constraint is binding, whereas the capital constraint is
not. In the second phase both the capital requirement and the nofail constraint are binding.
In the third phase (starting at 6%), only the capital requirement is binding. The inﬂuence of
the capital requirements on bank behaviour is given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If the optimal equity ratio of the bank in absence of regulation is higher than
6zero,the introduction of a binding capital requirement always reduces the optimal monitoring















Proof: As the only advantage of equity over deposits is that equity reduces the probability
of failure, the fact that the optimal equity ratio without regulation is higher than zero implies
that the nofail constraint is binding. This fail probability can be reduced either by holding
more equity, by putting more eﬀort in monitoring or by reducing loan supply (increasing
the price). In equilibrium the marginal cost of the three ways to fulﬁl the constraint will
be the same. An increase in the equity ratio will alleviate the nofail constraint and, as the
shadow prices for eﬀort and supply are nonzero with respect to this constraint, will lead to
a decrease in eﬀort (Panel c) and an increase in loan supply (Panel b). Once the minimum
capital requirement has risen above the point where the nofail constraint is no longer binding,
further increase of the minimum equity ratio will reduce the loan supply as the increased
ﬁnancing costs is the only mechanism then. Equation 5 follows directly from equating the
optimal output solutions for the regulated (Equation 16) and the unregulated (Equation 12)
case. For a more extensive proof, including proof that the capital requirement in Equation 5
is indeed higher than the voluntarily held capital ratio, see AppendixB. 
Panel a of Figure 1 shows the equilibrium proﬁt for the monopoly bank. Indeed proﬁt is
decreasing from the point on where the capital requirement becomes binding. Nevertheless,
Social welfare, computed as the sum of consumer surplus and bank proﬁt, increases initially
due to the capital requirement (Panel d). This result is due to the fact that the bank increases
output, and thereby increases the consumer surplus. This result indicates potential beneﬁcial
eﬀects of capital requirements, even in the case where banks would never fail.
2.3 Solution for two never failing banks
The second case to be considered is the one where both banks are in the market and where
the private cost of default are suﬃciently high for both banks not to gamble. As banks
risking bankruptcy are rather the exception than the rule, this exploration might tell us
something about the impact of regulation on sound banks. Two cases will be considered.
Under the standard scenario both banks are regulated. Under the alternative, only the good
bank is regulated. The latter case is particularly interesting for analysing the level playing
7Figure 2: Optimal proﬁt nonfailing banks for various capital requirements
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ﬁeld. Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (2000) found that eﬃcient banks bear a higher cost of
regulation than ineﬃcient banks, especially if the bad bank is not regulated. Surprisingly
enough, for moderate minimum capital requirements we ﬁnd exactly the opposite.
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium proﬁt of the two banks, using the calibration from Table
2. The calibration for the good bank is the same as before. The monitoring costs for the
ineﬃcient bank are assumed to be 25% higher than those for the eﬃcient bank. Reducing
expected credit losses by one half costs the ineﬃcient bank 2.5 percent of the principal of
the loan, whereas for the eﬃcient bank these costs are only 2 percent. The graphs for the
two nonfailing regulated banks display ﬁve diﬀerent phases, based on the relevance of the
two constraints facing the banks. In the ﬁrst phase, the nofail constraint is binding for
both banks, whereas the capital constraint is not. In the second phase (capital requirements
between 6.2% and 7.1%) the nofail constraint is still binding for both banks, whereas the
capital requirement is only binding for the eﬃcient bank. In the third phase the good bank
only faces a binding capital constraint and the bad bank only a binding nofail constraint.
If the bad bank is not regulated (dashed lines), this is the last phase. In the fourth phase
(between 7.9% and 8.8%) the capital constraint is binding for both and the nofail constraint
only for the ineﬃcient bank. In the last phase only the capital constraint is binding for both
banks.
Table 2: Parameters for two nonfailing banks
rρ Ω αG DG αB DB
4/100 8/100 6/5 1/50 1 1/40 1
The most surprising result shown in Figure 2 is that although in ﬁrst instance (phase two)
the capital requirement is only binding for the eﬃcient bank, this bank increases is proﬁt,
8whereas the proﬁt of the ineﬃcient bank drops. This proﬁt paradox is our Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In the unregulated case,the optimal capital ratio for the eﬃcient bank is
lower than for the ineﬃcient one. If the capital requirements are just binding for the eﬃcient
bank and not binding for the ineﬃcient one,proﬁts of the ineﬃcient bank will always drop,
whereas the proﬁt of the restricted bank may rise relative to the unregulated case.
Proof: The capital requirement hits the eﬃcient bank ﬁrst as the alternative for holding
equity, that is increasing monitoring eﬀort, is less expensive for this bank. A formal proof
is given in AppendixB. The drop in proﬁts for the ineﬃcient bank follows directly from
Proposition 1. As the eﬃcient bank will increase its output, the bad bank is confronted with
a lower residual demand. That the good bank might increase its proﬁt is shown in Figure 2.

The temporary increase in proﬁt for the restricted bank in phase two is due to a shift in
market share from the ineﬃcient bank to the eﬃcient one, see Figure 3. The question then
arises why the eﬃcient bank needs a regulator in order to be able to get this market share.
Why should he not declare to voluntarily held more capital and thereby achieve more output.
The reason is that such a declaration is not credible. Taken the optimal response of the other
bank as given, the eﬃcient bank could improve further by deviating from the announced
target. If the bank reduces both its loan supply, its eﬀort and its capital ratio, its proﬁts can
increase. Consequently, the restricted equilibrium is not a Cournot Nash equilibrium of the
unrestricted game.8
Whether the proﬁts of the eﬃcient bank will indeed increase depends on the reaction
of the other bank. Two opposing forces are at work. On the one hand the capital costs
of the bank increase due to the forced increase of its equity ratio. This will lead to lower
proﬁt, as shown for the monopoly case. The increase in the market share on the other hand
increases the restricted bank’s proﬁt. For our parameterization, the market share argument
dominates in ﬁrst instance. However, if the minimum capital requirement is increased further
(even within phase two when the nofail constraint is still binding) proﬁts of the eﬃcient bank
decline as the ﬁnancing cost argument starts dominating. Beyond the point where the nofail
constraint is no longer binding, the good bank starts losing market share again as the increased
ﬁnancing costs decrease its optimal output. In the fourth phase, where the bad bank also
8If the eﬃcient bank could credibly declare its capital ratio and loan supply,as the leader in a Stackleberg
game,its optimal proﬁt in the unregulated case would in general be much higher than the maximum proﬁt in
the restricted Cournot game. In that case imposing a binding capital requirement on the leader will always
reduce its proﬁt.
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faces a binding capital constraint if it is regulated, this process is accelerated as the nofail
constraint on the bad bank is loosening. Consequently, the bad bank can aﬀord a lower price
and therefore increases output (Figure 3). Here again, the proﬁt paradoxappears. The bad
bank is better oﬀ if it is regulated whereas the good bank is worse oﬀ (Figure 2). For higher
capital requirements, these result are reversed. The developments of proﬁts in the ﬁnal phase
are given in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The marginal percentage loss in proﬁts for the good bank in the ﬁnal phase
due to additional capital requirements is the highest if the good bank faces an unregulated
competitor,lower under monopoly and the lowest in a fully regulated duopoly. Compared with
the proﬁt losses of the regulated bad bank in duopoly,the losses of the good bank are higher
in absolute terms,but lower in relative terms. An unregulated bad bank will increase proﬁts
if the minimum capital requirements for the good bank are increased in the ﬁnal phase.
Proof: See AppendixB. 
This last phase is particularly important as opponents of capital requirements usually claim
that they are set too high. The proposition claims that even under these circumstances the
regulated bad bank is not better oﬀ than the good bank. However, if there are unregulated
competitors, too high capital requirements will have distortionary eﬀects as market share is
shifted from the eﬃcient to the ineﬃcient bank. Consequently, very high capital requirements
will endanger the level playing ﬁeld if not all ﬁnancial institutions are regulated. The same
conclusions hold for the model of Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (2000), but they do not
mention the (most relevant) results for the relative proﬁts.
In terms of optimal monitoring eﬀort the results for the two banks are similar to those for
the monopoly bank as optimal eﬀort is not aﬀected by the output of the other bank. Only
10the question to what extent the nofail constraint is binding is relevant here.
Figure 4 shows the welfare implications of regulation by means of capital requirements.
Not surprisingly, the duopoly solution results in higher welfare than monopoly (Figure 1d).
Moreover, as in the monopoly case, capital requirements may be beneﬁcial even in the case
that no bank will ever fail. The optimal welfare level is reached at 6.87%, which is within
phase two.











2.4 Solution if the bad bank might fail
As the main role of bank regulation is to prevent banks from failing, the biggest inﬂuence of
regulation might be expected for cases where banks might fail in the absence of regulation.
Indeed, that turns out to be the case (Proposition 4). In our model a proﬁtable fail strategy
is achieved by adjusting the private cost of bankruptcy for the bad bank (DB). Table 3 shows
the parameterization for this case. Apart from the lower value for DB it is identical to the
nofail case. DB is parameterized such that the bank makes a positive proﬁt in the good state
of the world but fails in the bad state. In this subsection, it will be assumed that both banks
are regulated.9
Table 3: Parameters if bad bank might fail
rρ Ω αG DG αB DB
4/100 8/100 6/5 1/50 1 1/40 1/200
9This assumption seems reasonable as an institution with a nonzero failprobability would not be able to
attract funds at the riskless deposit rate unless if it falls under a deposit insurance scheme. It that case it is
most likely also regulated.
11Proposition 4 The existence of a bank that chooses a fail strategy strongly aﬀects the prof-
itability of the good bank. Capital requirements can be used to prevent the bad bank from
choosing the fail strategy,thereby positively aﬀecting the proﬁtability of the good bank.
Proof: See Figures 5 and 6a. 
In the unregulated case, the bad bank may either gamble for a good state of the world
and ﬁnance its loans completely with deposits (fail strategy), or attract just enough capital to
avoid bankruptcy (nofail strategy). The latter strategy is discussed in the previous subsection.
Due to the limited liability of the bank, and the deposit insurance that ensures a ﬁxed deposit
rate, under the fail strategy only the outcome in the good state matters for the expected proﬁt
of the bank. Consequently, this bank can aﬀord a lower price for loans and therefore can
attract a large market share (Figure 6b). As monitoring eﬀort is only paying out in the good
state of the world, optimal monitoring eﬀort is lower for the fail strategy (Figure 6c). The
introduction of capital requirements introduces a ﬁnancing cost for the bank. The higher
the minimum equity ratio, the more money the bank loses in the bad state of the economy.
After some point it becomes more proﬁtable to prevent failure altogether. This is shown
graphically in Figure 5.
















The strategy the bad bank chooses has a huge impact on the proﬁtability of the good
bank (Figure 6a). The lower marginal cost of the bad bank, which is due to the limited
liability of the bank management, enables it to gain a large market share (Figure 6b). Once
the capital requirements become too high for the fail strategy to be proﬁtable (here from
3.3% on), we are back in the results of the previous subsection.
Figure 7a shows the social welfare implications of capital requirements, where welfare is
computed as the sum of proﬁts of the two banks, the consumer surplus and the cost of deposit
insurance. The consumer surplus will be higher under the bankruptcy regime as the total
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amount of loans supplied is higher and consequently the price of loans is lower (Figure 7b).
Nevertheless, even without taking the social cost of bankruptcy into account, the welfare
levels under the bankruptcy regime are substantially lower than under the nofail regime.
Introducing capital requirements will be strongly welfare improving if they are high enough
to prevent the bad bank from following a fail strategy.
Figure 7: Social welfare and price level for various capital requirements
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133 Conclusions
In the paper the competitive distortions of capital requirements are investigated. Contrary
to Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (2000) we ﬁnd that capital requirements impose a higher
burden on ineﬃcient banks than on eﬃcient ones. Especially if the ineﬃcient bank would
pursue a fail strategy in absence of regulation, capital requirements strongly improve the
proﬁtability of the eﬃcient bank.
Regarding the importance of a level playing ﬁeld, our results indicate that as long as
the competitors that are not regulated are not pursuing fail strategies, and if the capital
requirements are not too high, binding capital requirements may even increase the proﬁt of
the regulated bank whereas the proﬁt of the unregulated bank will drop. The situation that
the unregulated competitor follows a fail strategy can not well de analysed in our model as
one of the assumptions is that deposit rates are ﬁxed. If the competitor is indeed protected
by deposit insurance, he is not likely to be unregulated.
All in all, the distortionary eﬀects of capital requirements seem to be mild. One should
keep in mind however, that moral hazard problems hardly arise in this model as the asset side
of the model is ﬁxed. Banks can only invest in one kind of loans. An interesting extension
to the model might be the introduction of a second loan market with diﬀerent credit risk.
If the regulator is not able to diﬀerentiate between the markets, higher capital requirements
might result in more risk taking as it increases the funding costs of loans. Especially if the
regulator is not able to regulate all banks equally, the non-regulated bank might be able to
get a large proportion of the low-risk market, leaving the high-risk market for the regulated
banks. This will be left for future research.
14A Derivation of optima
The calculations made for this paper were all done in Mathematica 4.0 (Wolfram 1999). The
complete notebook is available from the author upon request.















and δτ ≥ δmin. (8)
The derivation of optima for bank τ (and bank χ) is always performed in a similar fashion.
If either of the two constraints is binding it is solved for either δτ, Qτ or mτ and subsequently
substituted in the proﬁt function (Equation 6). The remaining decision variables are deter-
mined by solving the ﬁrst order conditions together with the ﬁrst order conditions for the
rival bank. Finally, the second order conditions for both banks are checked to assure the
solution is indeed a maximum.
A.1 The monopoly case
The solutions are presented in general form, including a second bank (indexed χ), in order
to be able to use the results later on. For the monopoly bank solution, Qχ is zero and the
index τ should be replaced by G.
If bank τ is not regulated, it will choose an equity ratio which is just high enough to avoid
bankruptcy in the worst state of nature. Solving the nofail constraint (7) for δτ one gets:
δτ =
1
3(1 + mτ)(1 + r)
+
1+r + ατmτ + Qτ + Qχ − Ω
1+r
(9)
This result is substituted in the proﬁt function (6), the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to
mτ and Qτ are solved, second order conditions are checked for the only solution with positive
outcomes for both output and eﬀort (its a maximum), and this solution is substituted back
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If both the capital requirement and the nofail constraint are binding, ﬁrst the nofail
constraint can be solved for Qτ:
Qτ =Ω− Qχ −
1
3(1 + mτ)
− (1 + r)(1 − δτ) − ατmτ (14)
This expression and the capital requirement are substituted in the proﬁt function, after
which the ﬁrst order condition with respect to mτ is solved. This gives three solutions, one

























The imaginary parts in this equation exactly cancel, so this solution is real. This solution
can be substituted in (14) and (6) to get solutions for output and proﬁt respectively.
If the nofail constraint is no longer binding, the ﬁrst order conditions of Equation 6 with
respect to mτ and Qτ can be solved. The solution with positive eﬀort and output turns out






















16A.2 Two nonfailing banks
The method for solving the two bank case is similar to the one bank case for the unregulated
situation. First solve the nofail constraints for the optimal equity ratio (Equation 9) substitute
this is proﬁt functions (6) and derive the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to eﬀort and
output. The solutions for eﬀort are identical to the monopoly case as in the unregulated
case these do not depend on the output of the other bank (Equation 13). The ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to output should be solved simultaneously. The solution with positive
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−
1+r + αχ − 2ατ − Ω
3
(20)
The solution for the good bank with both a binding capital constraint and a binding nofail
constraint diﬀers somewhat from the monopoly case as the optimal output level of the other
bank depends on the loan supply of the constraint bank. Consequently, loan supply can not
be used to solve for the nofail constraint, as the ﬁrst order conditions of the rival bank would
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This solution, together with the capital requirement are substituted in the proﬁt function.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to output is derived. The optimal reaction of the
rival bank (Equation 12 with τ = B and χ = G) is subsequently substituted in this ﬁrst
order condition. This gives a complicated expression that has to be solved with respect to
own output. The problem has three solutions, two of which generate positive proﬁt levels.
For one of these two the capital requirement turns out not to be binding, so it is not a
valid solution. According to the second order condition, the other one results indeed in a
maximum. The solution is too messy to report however (5 pages of Mathematica output).
17With this solution at hand, the solution for the other decision variables follows directly by
substitution.
In the third phase, the good bank only faces a binding capital constraint whereas for
the bad bank only the nofail constraint is binding. The solutions for optimal eﬀort follow
directly from the monopoly bank results (Equations 17 respectively 13) as these results do not
depend on the actions of the rival bank (other than via the inﬂuence on the nofail constraint).
After the optimal capital ratios (using Equation 8 respectively 9) and monitoring eﬀorts are
substituted in the proﬁt functions, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to loan supply are












































































In the fourth phase the bad bank faces two binding constraints, whereas the good bank
only faces a binding capital constraint. The solution method is similar to phase two. The
optimal eﬀort of the bad bank is determined as the solution to the binding nofail constraint
(Equation 21). This result and the binding capital constraint are substituted in its proﬁt
function. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to output is derived. In this ﬁrst order
condition, the optimal output of the good bank is substituted (Equation 16). The equation
is solved for QB and the right solution is selected. Again, two of the three solutions result
in a positive proﬁt, but for one of them the capital constraint is not binding. According to
the second order conditions the valid solution is indeed a maximum. Results for the good
bank can subsequently be obtained by substituting this solution in the optimal results of the
capital constrained bank (Equations 15 to 17).
In the last phase both bank only face a binding capital constraint. After substituting the
capital constraints and the optimal eﬀort levels (Equation 17) the ﬁrst order conditions with






















− 15(1 + r + αχ − 2ατ − Ω+ρδmin)
45
(28)
A.3 Failprobability higher than zero


















In order to solve the model, ﬁrst calculate the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to mB and
QB. Then substitute the optimal output of the good bank (Equation 12), assuming that the
capital requirement is not binding for this bank. Next, solve the ﬁrst order conditions and







































The results for the good bank are obtained by substituting Equation 31 in the unregulated
monopoly bank solutions (Equations 10 to 12):
ΠG =

























αG(1 + r + ρ)
(1 + r)
 




















19B Proof of Propositions
B.1 Proposition 1
The fact that monitoring eﬀort reduces after the capital constraint becomes binding follows
directly from a comparison between Equations 13 and 17:
√
7+7 r +2 5 ρ
5
 








for every positive ρ.
The length of the range of capital constraints for which loan supply is increased (denoted

















αG(1 + r + ρ)
(1 + r)
 
3(7 + 7r +2 5 ρ)
−
1+r − αG + QB − Ω
2(1 + r)
(37)
In order to check whether this length is positive Ω is substituted by the minimum amount
necessary for the bank to make a positive proﬁt (solving Equation 10 equals zero for Ω) plus
a nonnegative extra (denoted  ):
Ω=1+r + QB − αG +
2
 
αG(7 + 7r +2 5 ρ)
5
 
3(1 + r + ρ)
+   (38)














Only the part within brackets might be negative, but in fact is not either as:
 
7+7 r +1 6 ρ
 




(1 + r + ρ)(7 + 7r +2 5 ρ)
> 0 (40)
Consequently, for every positive risk premium there is a positive range of capital requirements
for which the restricted bank will increase its output.
This result will also hold if there are more banks involved that do not face a binding
capital constraint. The result is obtained under the assumption that the other bank will not
react, which is the case in a monopoly. In a duopoly, if the other bank is not restricted, the
only thing that changes for him is the increased output of its rival. As this decreases the
residual demand for loans, this will lead to a decrease in its own supply, leading to an even
higher increase of output of the restricted bank.
20B.2 Proposition 2
In the unregulated case, the diﬀerence between the optimal capital ratios for the two banks
(Equation 19) is equal to:


















(1 + r + ρ)(7 + 7r +2 5 ρ)
(41)
In order to check positivity of the second term in the numerator, take the diﬀerence between









































is always fulﬁlled as the optimal eﬀort level would not be positive if it was not.
B.3 Proposition 3
Both for monopoly and for duopoly, the equilibrium proﬁt for a bank that faces a binding
capital constraint, but no default constraint, is equal to the square of its output (see Equations
15 and 16, 22 and 25 respectively 27 and 28). The partial derivatives of proﬁt of the good
bank with respect to the capital requirements under these circumstances are −ρQG for a
monopoly, −4
3ρQG when confronted with an unregulated competitor and −2
3ρQG when faced
with an regulated competitor. Consequently, in absolute terms the loss must be bigger under
monopoly than under a regulated duopoly as output under monopoly can not be lower than
under duopoly. Dividing by total proﬁts (= Q2
G) leads to the conclusion that the relative proﬁt
loss is highest if the good bank faces an unregulated competitor, smaller under monopoly and
smallest if the bad bank is also regulated. The latter inequality holds as long as the output of
the good bank under a regulated duopoly is at least two third of the output under monopoly.
As the good bank is supposed to be more eﬃcient (αG <α B), this is always the case (its
output will be exactly two third of the monopoly output if both banks are equally eﬃcient).
The absolute losses of the unregulated bad bank are higher than those of the good bank
as 2
3ρQG > 2









3(1+r) (see Equations 23 and 26), which is always positive.
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